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ABSTRACT
Ancillaries have become a major source of revenue and profitability
in the travel industry. Yet, conventional pricing strategies are based
on business rules that are poorly optimized and do not respond to
changing market conditions.
This paper describes the dynamic pricing model developed by
Deepair solutions, an AI technology provider for travel suppliers.
We present a pricing model that provides dynamic pricing recom-
mendations specific to each customer interaction and optimizes
expected revenue per customer. The unique nature of personalized
pricing provides the opportunity to search over the market space
to find the optimal price-point of each ancillary for each customer,
without violating customer privacy.
In this paper, we present and compare three approaches for dy-
namic pricing of ancillaries, with increasing levels of sophistication:
(1) a two-stage forecasting and optimization model using a logistic
mapping function; (2) a two-stage model that uses a deep neural
network for forecasting, coupled with a revenue maximization tech-
nique using discrete exhaustive search; (3) a single-stage end-to-end
deep neural network that recommends the optimal price. We de-
scribe the performance of these models based on both offline and
online evaluations. We also measure the real-world business impact
of these approaches by deploying them in an A/B test on an air-
line’s internet booking website. We show that traditional machine
learning techniques outperform human rule-based approaches in
an online setting by improving conversion by 36% and revenue per
offer by 10%. We also provide results for our offline experiments
which show that deep learning algorithms outperform traditional
machine learning techniques for this problem. Our end-to-end deep
learning model is currently being deployed by the airline in their
booking system.
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• Computing methodologies→ Supervised learning by clas-
sification; Cost-sensitive learning; Neural networks; Model-
ing methodologies; • Applied computing→ Transportation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Ancillaries are optional products or services sold by businesses
to complement their primary product [3]. In the airline industry,
these services or products can be directly related to a passenger’s
flight itinerary, such as baggage allowance, leg room, seat upgrades
or meals, or may be related to the passenger’s overall travel plan,
for example, hotel rooms, rental cars, or destination activities. The
estimated ancillary revenue collected by major US air carriers was
more than $18 billion in 2015, and $59 billion for airlines around
the world in the same year [12].
Even though this revenue stream is clearly substantial to the
airline industry, its pricing strategies are not fully developed due to
its recent emergence in the market. Because these products were
traditionally not offered as ancillaries, airlines have little knowledge
of the relationship between the customers’ choice of primary prod-
uct and the ancillary product. Moreover, given the now optional
nature of these products, ancillary purchases are a result of deep
personal preferences of each individual and the context of their trip.
Consequently, airlines experience very low conversion rates (less
than 5%) for ancillaries. Understanding these personal preferences
based on the context of each shopping session is crucial to pricing
them effectively and generating revenue. Moreover, various ancil-
laries compete with each other’s "shelf-space" on the website and
wallet-share of the customer, so pricing an ancillary in the context
of other ancillaries confounds the problem.
Currently, the majority of ancillary products are static price-
points, i.e., invariant to customer or itinerary characteristics. Our
aim is to develop a price recommendation system specific to ancil-
lary services, to price these products dynamically based on itinerary-
specific information.
Each booking session on an airline’s website can be modeled
using the state space represented in Figure 1. The first three steps
involve the primary product, which is a set of seats on aircraft
connecting the origin to the destination, referred to as right-to-
fly; while ancillary offerings and corresponding customer choice
occur from state 4 onwards. Note that in this work we consider
only ancillaries offered during the booking session, and not those
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1. User initiates a search
2. Supplier offers flight 
options
3. User selects a flight offer
4. Supplier offers ancillaries 
5. User accepts optional 
ancillary offers
6. User pays and completes 
transaction
Figure 1: User live session as state space
booked later, such as adding bags after reaching the airport. The
goal of this work is to optimize prices dynamically, while estimating
willingness to pay; and therefore we will address the latter case in
future work.
Conventional pricing frameworks are static, and not capable
of recommending a price conditioned upon rich session-specific
information. Our pricing suggestions are generated through an
A/B testing framework that directs live booking traffic to various
deployed models. The integration specifications for inference and
data retrieval for training, with respect to the current pipeline at
an airline booking engine, are described in Figure 2.
Our contributions are as follows.
• Wepresent a rich, customized, session-specific dynamic price
recommendation system for ancillary services that signif-
icantly outperforms existing pricing systems in terms of
revenue.
• We develop a deep learning model that effectively estimates
purchase probability and simultaneously prices the ancillary
product, by modeling monotonicity properties of customers’
willingness to pay. This model provides improved revenues
and captures customers’ behavior more accurately than se-
quential models that combine traditional machine learning
(or deep learning) models followed by revenue optimization.
• Our model predicts human choice more accurately than our
baseline model, resulting in increased conversion for the
ancillary product.
• We implement and test our models on real data, both on his-
torical data and by live testing in an airline’s booking system,
and demonstrate both offline and online improvement based
on live customer usage statistics.
Ancillary Pricing 
Model
Human-Curated 
Pricing System
Model Parameters
Internet Booking Engine (airline.com)
Scheduled Online 
Training
Customer Shopping and Transaction Database
Price Request & 
Response with 
Customer Context
Price Request & 
Response
deepair modules
Existing interface
Airline booking platform
A/B Testing Mode
Figure 2: System integration with existing pipeline
1.1 Related Work
Unbundling is the process of separating a product into primary
and ancillary products to allow customers more flexibility of pur-
chase, and businesses to increase revenues by matching customer
needs more accurately. In the airline industry, this phenomenon
has been led by low-cost carriers (LCCs), whose operational and
pricing models rely heavily on ancillary fees. In recent years, many
legacy airlines have adopted this strategy [10]. Despite an initial
response through negative emotions and retaliatory behavior [20],
unbundling of services into the basic right-to-fly and additionally
priced ancillary services (bags, meals, etc.) has gradually gained
acceptance among customers [14]. In fact, revenue from ancillary
services in the airline industry have nearly tripled in the past decade,
from 3% to 8% of total revenue [19].
Studies on this new phenomena in the airline context are ongo-
ing [1, 6]. Economics literature indicates that the practice of offering
add-ons (an equivalent term for ancillaries) can raise equilibrium
profits when airlines compete; and can also be used for price dis-
crimination and customer segmentation [8]. Allon et al[1] argue
that unbundling and baggage fees are consistent with reduction
of airline operating costs, but may not effectively segment cus-
tomers. Customer characteristics and the airline’s ability to price
discriminate are also shown to significantly influence its profits
[6]. Bockelie and Belobaba [3] study behavioral models of ancil-
lary product purchase, and specifically comparing the difference
in price perceptions of customers who purchase ancillary services
sequentially or simultaneously. While multiple behavioral theoreti-
cal models [9, 13, 16] based on risk perception, knowledge levels
and bounded rationality; and discrete choice models [2] are typi-
cally used to model customer choice, there is limited literature that
explicitly models the relationship between ancillary services and
the primary product (itinerary, or fare class).
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Topics in dynamic pricing of homogeneous products have been
extensively studied [7]. In fact, dynamic pricing has been a catalyst
for innovation in various transport and service industries. Ride-
hailing platforms have used surge pricing to match demand and
supply, and to avoid the "wild-goose chase" problem [5]. Related
to our problem is the work of Ye et al. [21] for Airbnb accommoda-
tion pricing. They formulate a custom scheme to optimally price
each product using a triple-stage model with booking probability
classification, price-suggestion regression and seller-specific logic.
Whereas Airbnb considers all their listings as unique and all the
customers identical, we consider the inverse problem of identical
products and unique customers.
2 PRICING FACTORS
In this section, we discuss the two primary factors we use to deter-
mine the optimal price for an ancillary: the demand function and
customer attributes.
2.1 Demand Function
An estimation of a demand curve D(P) as a function of price P , can
be obtained by evaluating the variation of demand with respect
to price. Then, the optimal price can be obtained via maximizing
the expected revenue based on the estimated demand curve. The
optimal value can only be obtained when the demand functionD(P)
is an accurate estimate of the actual demand in the market, else the
P∗ and corresponding revenue will be sub-optimal.
P∗ = argmax
P
P × D(P) (1)
For airline ancillaries, the demand function D is not just a func-
tion of price P offered but also of customer attributes x. Hence,
a better estimation of the demand function is D(P ,x) and can be
obtained by observing the change in demand conditioned on both
price P and customer attributes x. In our study, we implement and
compare two algorithms to estimate the probability of a customer
purchasing an offered ancillary, which we assume to be a proxy for
estimated demand D(P ,x). Details of our algorithms are presented
in Section 3.
2.2 Customer Attributes
We define a customer’s attributes, x, as the set of factors that in-
fluences the probability of that customer purchasing the offered
ancillary, at a given price. The major attributes that the demand
function is found to be significantly dependent on are time, market,
items already in the cart and length of stay.
Time. There are two types of time-related factors that heavily influ-
ence the demand function: (1) Days to departure: Price sensitivity
captures the relationship between the price and the propensity for
purchasing the product. Usually, customers who buy their tickets
far in advance are more price sensitive than customers who buy
closer to departure. (2) Departure date and time: Like the right-to-fly,
ancillary demand has strong time-of-day and seasonal variations.
Itineraries starting on certain days and times have higher ‘quality’
and hence increased demand; due to factors such as higher con-
venience of time of travel, better connectivity (neither too long
nor too short connection time), better availability of alternative
connections, special events, and holidays. The quality of service
has a strong correlation with the type of passengers it attracts. It is
well-known that low quality services tend to be cheaper and attract
more price sensitive customers.
Figure 3: Market clusters’ probability of ancillary purchase
Markets. Airlines serve a large variety of markets. A market is a
tuple comprising of the origin and destination of the trip. Certain
markets are served with a larger fraction of non-stop itineraries,
while others may be served with larger fractions of itineraries con-
taining connections. Certain markets have a heavier fraction of
business trips, while others consist primarily of leisure trips. As
shown in Figure 3, there are clusters of markets that have high
demand for ancillary services as compared to others. To estimate
the demand using (1), we segment these clusters into sub-markets.
We define sub-markets as a mapping from a vector of customer at-
tributes x to an origin-destination cluster where estimated demand
is statistically similar for a given prior ancillary price.
Length of Stay. For those passenger bookings that are round-trips,
we define Length of stay (LOS) as the number of days a passenger
plans to stay at the destination. If the passenger does not have a
return ticket we consider LOS to be 0. Figure 4 shows estimated
kernel density function for LOS for two types of bookings: when an
ancillary was purchased (dashed line), and for all bookings (solid
line). These estimated graphs are irregular from normalized LOS
values of 0.0 to 0.3 (approximately), indicating higher chances of
ancillary purchase for LOS durations that are neither too short
nor too long. These irregularities indicate that passengers prefer
to purchase ancillaries (such as bags), for medium length trips
for which they might require additional storage space. Hence, the
apparent signature describes the conditional importance of the LOS
attribute.
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Figure 4: LOS signal from KDE
3 PRICING MODELS
Our pricing model consists of two components: (i) an ancillary pur-
chase probability model that is structured as a binary classification
problem, and (ii) a revenue optimization model that, given the prob-
ability of purchase, recommends an optimal price that maximizes
the airline’s expected revenue.
We make the following assumptions:
• Pricing range: The recommended ancillary price is allowed to
vary only within a legal range defined by business strategy
as mentioned in section 6.
• Monotonicity in willingness to pay: If a customer is willing to
purchase a product for price p, they are willing to purchase
the same product at a price p′ < p. Similarly, if a customer
is unwilling to purchase a product at price p, they will be
unwilling to purchase at a price p′ > p.
We implement three different pricing models, of increasing com-
plexity, shown in Figure 5. These are embedded into the framework
in Figure 2.
(1) Ancillary purchase prediction with logistic mapping
(APP-LM): This model uses a Gaussian Naive Bayes with
clustered features (GNBC) model for ancillary purchase prob-
ability prediction and a pre-calibrated logistic price mapping
function for revenue optimization.
(2) Ancillary purchase prediction with exhaustive search
(APP-DES): This model uses a Deep-Neural Network (DNN)
trained using a weighted cross-entropy loss function for
ancillary purchase probability estimation. For price opti-
mization, we implement a simple discrete exhaustive search
algorithm that finds the optimal price point within the pric-
ing range.
(3) End-to-EndDNNwith custom loss function (DNN-CL):
This DNN-based model is trained on a customized loss func-
tion, and presented in section 3.3. This loss function is de-
signed using the strategic model objective function[21] and
explicitly models the dominance properties embeddedwithin
the willingness to pay assumption.
In APP-LM and APP-DES, the ancillary purchase probability model
and the revenue optimizationmodel are sequential whereas in DNN-
CL, they are simultaneously solved to achieve the recommended
price.
Human
Rules Curated By 
Human
APP-LM
Ancillary 
Purchase 
Prediction
(GNBC)
APP-DES End-to-End 
DNN-CL
Deep Neural 
Network with 
Customised 
Loss
Logistic Mapping
Ancillary 
Purchase 
Prediction
(DNN)
Discrete 
Exhaustive 
Search
Figure 5: Schematic of Ancillary Pricing Models
3.1 Ancillary Purchase Probability Model
Our ancillary purchase probability model estimates the demand
curve within a sub-market for each offered ancillary, for a given
price of the ancillary. This is formulated as a binary classification
problem. We aim to estimate the probability distribution function
fθ (x , P), where x | x ⊆ x, is the feature vector and P is the of-
fered price. We used over 30 features that fall under the following
categories:
• Temporal features : Length of stay, seasonality (time of the
day, month of the year, etc), time of departure, time of shop,
time to departure.
• Market-specific features : Arrival and destination airport,
arrival and destination city, ancillary popularity for the route,
etc.
• Price comparison scores : Scores based on alternative/same
flights across/within the booking class.
• Journey specific features : Group size, booking class, fare
group, number of stops, etc.
As mentioned earlier, the binary classification task is highly
challenging because ancillary purchase is highly imbalanced (class
ratios of 6 : 100). For APP-LM, We first experiment with many tra-
ditional classification algorithms like Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB),
Gaussian Naive Bayes with clustered features (GNBC), Random
Forest (RF), using features chosen based on principal component
analysis for these algorithms [15].
For APP-DES, we use a customized deep neural network (DNN)
trained on weighted cross entropy loss, as a classifier. While the
DNN did not require a lot of feature engineering, we experimented
with various hyper-parameters like network architecture, drop-out
rates, activation functions, optimization algorithms, and conver-
gence criteria.
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3.2 Revenue Optimization
Logistic Price Mapping Function. In our base model APP-LM, once
the ancillary purchase probability is predicted, we use a logistic
function to recommend a price. The intuition behind using logistic
mapping is that the ancillary can be priced closer to the maximum
of the pricing range when the probability of purchase is high, and
lower for low probabilities. Hence, a price mapping is chosen based
on (2).
Pr ec =
L
1 + exp −k(x − x0) (2)
Pr
ic
e 
of
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ry
Probability of purchase
Aggressive pricing 
Conservative pricing
Figure 6: Logistic mapping from probability of purchase to
a recommended price.
According to (2), three parameters can be controlled to map the
price desirably.
• Max value, L : this is the full price of the ancillary
• Shape factor, k : the shape or steepness of the curve
• Mid point, x0 : the mid point of the sigmoid curve
The shape factork andmid-pointx0 can be fine-tuned to be either
aggressive or conservative with pricing. This tuning is illustrated
in Figure 6, indicating that at low purchase probabilities, the model
compensates by reducing the recommended price.
Discrete Exhaustive Search. Exhaustive search can be efficiently
performed over a small set of discrete prices that are within the
pricing range. For a given probability of purchase fθ (x , P) and price
P , expected revenue is computed using (3).
EˆP = P × fθ (x , P) (3)
Without assuming that the revenue function is convex but only
unimodal, an exhaustive search over all allowed prices can be per-
formed, as represented in figure 7. The convexity assumption is
met only when price sensitivity has a small derivative in the region
of interest. Thereby, using exhaustive search, the optimal price can
be evaluated using equation 4. As discussed in Section 2.1, the opti-
mality of the price Pr ec is dependent on the accuracy of estimation
of the demand.
Maximum
Expected Revenue 
Discrete legal prices
Probability of  
Ancillary 
Purchase
Price of 
Ancillary
Figure 7: An illustration of a discrete search in the price
range
Pr ec = argmax
P
EˆP (4)
The performance of a two-stage sequential forecasting and opti-
mization method (like APP-LM and APP-DES), depends on a good
demand estimate over the permissible range of prices. This requires
sufficient exposure of those prices in the market to learn an accu-
rate price sensitivity curve for each sub-market. Without such data,
approximate methods such as custom loss functions can produce
more revenue in practice.
3.3 Customized Loss Function for DNN-CL
In this section, we present a customized loss function that takes
into account a regret of pricing low, conditional on the ancillary
being purchased; and a penalty for recommending high, conditional
on it not being purchased. The objective function is inspired from
the strategic model proposed by Ye et al. [21] and ϵ-insensitive
loss used in SVR[17]. We enhance this strategic model using latent
variables to incorporate the monotonicity in the willingness to pay
assumption in our loss function. Suppose we are given N training
samples {xi ,yi }Ni=1, where xi is the feature vector and yi is the
ground truth label for the ith session. For purchased ancillaries, yi
equals 1 and 0 otherwise. The recommended price Pr ec for feature
vector x is denoted by Pr ec = FΘ(x ,P), where Θ is a set of train-
able parameters that can be learned for the mapping function F,
and P is a set of discrete price points in the pricing range.
The objective of the learning is to minimize the loss L given as
L = argmin
θ
N∑
i=1
|P |∑
j=1
(Φlb + Φub ) · 1(σi j>0) (5)
where the lower bound function Φlb and upper bound function
Φub are defined as,
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Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 Pi5 Pi6
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 Pi5 Pi6
yi = δi. = 1
Ancillary 
purchased
Ancillary 
not purchased
yi = δi. = 0
yi : ground truth
δi4 : latent variableδi3δi2δi1
δi3 δi4 δi5 δi6
yi
Figure 8: Latent variable δ mapping from ground truth y
Φlb = max
(
0,
(
L(Pi j ,δi j ) −FΘ(xi ,P)
))
Φub = max
(
0,
(
FΘ(xi ,P) −U (Pi j ,δi j )
))
where δi j , shown in Figure 8, is a latent variable that ensures
the monotonicity in the willingness to pay assumption by taking
the current ground truth yi into account. The indicator function
1(σi j>0) selects loss values corresponding to those δi j which satisfy
the monotonicity condition. Therefore, δi j is defined as
δi j (yi ) =
{
yi if σi j ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(6)
Where, σ is the willingness to pay factor, defined as:
σi j = (j − j∗) · (−1)yi (7)
Assuming prices are listed in ascending order, j∗ is the index at
which Pi j equals FΘ(xi ,P). We use L andU for the lower bound
and the upper bound of the optimal price range, respectively. The
functions L(Pi j ,δi j ) andU (Pi j ,δi j ) are defined as follows:
L(Pi j ,δi j ) = δi j · Pi j + (1 − δi j ) · c1Pi j (8)
When the ancillary is purchased, the lower bound L is the pur-
chase price Pi j . Otherwise, a lower price of c1Pi j is set to be the
lower bound, where c1 ∈ (0, 1).
U (Pi j ,δi j ) = (1 − δi j ) · Pi j + δi j · c2Pi j (9)
The upper boundU is Pi j when the ancillary is not purchased,
whereas if the ancillary is purchased, a price of c2Pi j (c2 > 1) is set
as the upper bound.
Table 1: Lower bound and Upper bound loss values
Prices Φlb · 1(σi j>0) Φub · 1(σi j>0)
Pi j < FΘ 0 max(0,FΘ(xi ,P) − c2Pi j )
Pi j = FΘ 0 0
Pi j > FΘ max(0, c1Pi j −FΘ(xi ,P)) 0
Table 1 illustrates the lower and upper bound loss values for
recommended price with respect to discrete price points. For Pi j <
FΘ(xi ,P), the upper bound loss increases linearly. For upper bound
loss to be non-zero, c2 > FΘ(xi ,P)Pi j . Similarly, for non-zero loss, the
bounds on c1 are set to FΘ(xi ,P)Pi j < c1 < 1. For c1 = c2 = 1, the
lower bound and upper bound are equal and hence the optimal
price will be the jth price in the price set P. Therefore, c1 and c2
can be chosen to change the gap between the lower and upper
bounds.
4 PRICING MODEL EVALUATION
In the absence of optimal price values or the best hindsight strat-
egy, it was important to the airline to define a set of offline and
online metrics. Offline metrics are useful for model development,
incremental learning, hyper-parameter optimization while online
metrics measure business value. Establishing the exact set of offline
metrics that correlates with online business metrics is an active
area of research.
4.1 Offline Metrics
In this section, we define the metrics that we use to serve as guides
through hyper-parameter tuning and to ensure that nightly update
of DNN weights do not overfit the data. We use the Price Decrease
Recall (PDR) and Price Decrease Precision (PDP) scores presented by
Ye et al. [21] due to their high correlation with the airline’s business
metrics. PDR measures how likely our recommended prices are
lower than the current offered prices for non purchased ancillary
and PDP measures the percentage for recommended prices that
are lower than current offered prices for non purchased ancillary.
Additionally, we use the following metrics:
Area Under the Curve (AUC). Due to presence of high class imbal-
ance as discussed in Section 3.1, we used the AUC of the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve as the offline metric to com-
pare ancillary purchase prediction model performance.
Regret Score (RS). In recent work [21], regret score has been cho-
sen as an offline evaluation criterion because of its proportional
relationship to the business metric. RS is defined by equation (10).
RS = mean
purchases
(
max
(
0, 1 − P
r ec
P
) )
(10)
Intuitively, RS measures on an average how close our recom-
mended price Pr ec was to the true purchase price P . For the example
set of sessions in Table 2, sessions 1, 2 and 5 have 0.20, 0.20 and 0.75
regret respectively. Because sessions 3 and 4 have recommended
price higher than purchased, regret is 0. Therefore, RS values for
this sample of sessions is 0.095.
Price Decrease F1 (PDF1). This score is inspired by the F1 score
used to evaluate the precision and recall trade-off. PDF1 therefore
measures the trade-off between PDR and PDP according to (11).
PDF1 = 2 · PDR · PDP
PDR + PDP
(11)
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Table 2: Example prices for purchased sessions
Session # Purchase Price Recommended Price
1 10 8
2 15 12
3 10 15
4 25 35
5 40 37
4.2 Online Metrics
Online metrics represent real-world business metrics that indicate
if a model is driving business value. We use two key metrics to
measure the performance of a model in the real world.
Conversion Score. One of the primary business metric is the con-
version ratio, i.e., the percentage of offers that are being purchased
and converted into orders.
Conversion Score = Number of purchasesTotal number of sessions (12)
Revenue per session. The revenue per session (RPS) metric is one of
the most essential business metrics to quantify actual performance.
5 TRAINING
All of our deep neural network models (in APP-DES and DNN-CL)
are trained on NVIDIA Tesla K80 GPU. We used stochastic gradient
descent (SGD)[4] with a decaying learning rate to optimize the
loss function. Mini-Batches and drop-out units [11, 18] are used
to regularize model training. For a discrete exhaustive search over
the prices (see Section 3.2), we use a mini-batch of the allowed
price inputs to enable a single call to the GPU which minimizes
data transfer and model setup cost for each price selection event.
Hyperparameters like c1 and c2 are tuned using the bounds for non-
zero loss and the upper-lower bound gap (see Section 3.3) over the
median price point in set P. We also use the scheduled mini-batch
training approach for online model training.
6 EXPERIMENTS
During the first phase of online experimentation, our airline part-
ner’s business strategy is to recommend prices equal to or less than
the current human-offered price. Although this strategy reduces
the search space considerably, the business motivation behind it is
to reduce the overall friction in the traveler’s journey by providing
them an incentive to pre-purchase ancillaries online. Therefore, the
aim of our online experiment is to offer discounts in an intelligent
way, so that we improve the conversion rate of ancillaries without
dropping the revenue per offer. This also has a potential negative
impact of increasing conversion score without improving revenue
per session. Therefore, as mentioned in Section 4, using the right
set of metrics for evaluation is crucial.
6.1 Offline Experiments
We perform extensive offline experiments to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the models before deployment. These offline experiments
Figure 9: ROC curve for offline trained model
consist of two parts : (i) evaluating classifiers’ performance of an-
cillary purchase probability, and (ii) pricing effectiveness of a two-
stage forecasting and optimization model versus a simultaneous,
end-to-end pricing model.
6.1.1 Classifier Performance. It is critical to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the ancillary purchase probability (APP) classifier since
we are using it to estimate the demand function. Due to the high
class imbalance present in the data, we used the AUC score to eval-
uate the performance. We started with Gaussian Naive Bayes with
Clustering (GNBC) as our baseline to match the state of the art in
the airline industry. We then ran the experiments with the Gaussian
Naive Bayes (GNB), Random Forest (RF) and DNN classifiers, all of
which performed better than the GNBC baseline. The AUC scores
of 0.5716, 0.6273, 0.6633 and 0.7664 for GNBC, GNB, RF and DNN
respectively, show that the DNN achieves a 33% improvement in the
AUC score compared to our baseline. This improvement is intuitive
because DNNs can capture more complex relationships between
the input features to predict highly imbalanced classes.
To evaluate the learn-ability and robustness of the classifiers,
three datasets with varying amount of data are used. Datasets
A, B and C have 41, 000, 50, 000 and 72, 000 sessions respectively.
Results from our experiments are in Table 3. DNN shows most
dominant signs of learn-ability with increasing dataset size. The
best performance of these classifiers on the validation set is also
presented as an ROC curve in Figure 9.
6.1.2 Pricing effectiveness of a sequential two-stage model versus a
simultaneous end-to-end model. Although the DNN performs well
for Ancillary Probability Prediction, it was important to also mea-
sure the effectiveness of the final price recommendations from each
pricing model. We used the offline metrics defined in Section 4.1
to perform the comparison between the two-stage sequential fore-
casting and optimization models (APP-LM and APP-DES), and the
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Table 3: AUC score of models on datasets.
Dataset GNBC GNB RF DNN
A 0.5444 0.6013 0.6646 0.6755
B 0.5274 0.6186 0.6771 0.6967
C 0.5716 0.6273 0.6633 0.7664
simultaneous end-to-end pricing model (DNN-CL). Given the busi-
ness requirement to provide discounts on the human-recommended
price, we considered Regret Score (RS) and Price Decrease Recall
(PDR) as more important than PDP and PDF1 [21]. Our results are
summarized in Table 4. The APP-LM (which uses our baseline APP
model and is manually tuned through a parameter search), serves as
our baseline for pricing effectiveness. The inefficient performance
of the APP-DES model on these metrics despite the estimation of a
good APP model in the first step suggests that the price-demand
relationship (see Figure 7) is not estimated accurately. This short-
coming is overcome by the end-to-end model (DNN-CL), which not
only overcomes the effect of this inaccuracy but also outperforms
the APP-LM on all four metrics.
Table 4: Comparison of scores for differentmodels in offline
experiments.
Scores APP-LM APP-DES DNN-CL
RS 0.0741 0.3776 0.0726
PDR 0.6366 0.6303 0.8294
PDP 0.9276 0.9320 0.9230
PDF1 0.7550 0.7520 0.8737
Hence, we conclude that the DNN-CL model not only minimizes
the regret for not pricing high for purchased ancillaries, but also
maximizes the likelihood of the recommended prices being low
when ancillaries are not purchased.
6.2 Online Experiments
Our APP-LMmodel has been deployed in production on our partner
airline’s internet booking engine for model validation. The APP-
DES and the DNN-CL models are currently under deployment,
following their successful performance according to the offline
metrics.
According to the airline’s business strategy, we introduced a
random discount model in addition to the APP-LM model. This
random discount model is allowed to recommend discounted prices
based on Gaussian noise. There are two reasons for deploying
a random price recommender. First, it establishes a baseline for
conversion score improvements from discounted ancillaries. Second,
it enables us to explore various prices and calibrate price sensitivity.
The deployed models are compared with both human-curated static
prices and prices from the random discount model. All three were
deployed concurrently in an A/B testing setting for a period of 120
days. The results of this comparison for the most recent 30 days
are shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Conversion percentage and revenue generated by
our model (APP-LM) compared to human-curated and ran-
dom prices
Pricing System Avg. Revenue per Offer Conversion Score
HUMAN 1.00 10.18%
RANDOM 0.77 12.37%
APP-LM 1.10 13.92%
Figure 11 and Table 5 indicate that the random discount model
is able to produce higher conversion rates than the human-curated
pricing system. This not only demonstrates the existence of price
sensitivity among customers, but also allows us to measure it. Ad-
ditionally, the random discount model is unable to produce higher
revenue per offer because it conflates the sub-markets’ demand and
makes them indistinguishable, thus losing information.
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Figure 10: Revenue Per Offer by Each Pricing System Over
Time
Because customers’ price sensitivity is observed through the
random discount model, a slight increase in the conversion score
was expected in our deployed model APP-LM. The results in Table 5,
Figure 10 and Figure 111 confirm this expectation. We observe a 36%
increase in conversion rate, which is a 15% increase compared to the
random discount model. More importantly, our model produces 10%
more revenue than the human-curated pricing system. This implies
that our model recommends lower prices to targeted customers
such that the revenue per offer from our model can still outperform
(or at least be comparable to) the human-curated pricing system. For
revenue per offer and conversion score, we see that our model can
indeed capture the market trend in a timely fashion. Furthermore,
the clear trend of both higher revenue and higher conversion score
with respect to the human-curated system indicate the accuracy of
target discount with the customer’s context.
1The exact dates and revenue figures cannot be included due to proprietary, privacy
and sensitivity restrictions
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7 FUTUREWORK
Historically, price sensitivity to ancillaries has not been captured
due to static pricing. However, it is critical to capture customers’
price sensitivity to price the product correctly and maximize rev-
enues. Currently, all of our proposed models - APP-LM, APP-DES
and DNN-CL - are in early exploratory stage to capture and train
on the ground truth responses of customers. While APP-LM has
been deployed online, APP-DES and DNN-CL are currently being
deployed. Once model validation is performed online, the airline’s
booking system will switch to the most robust model. For the APP-
DES and DNN-CL models, we are specifically interested in further
examining the correlation between offline model performance to
online business performance, because they outperform APP-LM in
offline experimentation. Further, our deployment system will be
transitioned from a scheduled mini-batch training (see Section 5), to
an event-wise online training. This transition will enable the model
to accurately learn temporal dependencies. We also plan to alter
the current business strategy (see Section 6) to allow our model to
recommend prices higher then current limit, and observe customer
responses. Finally, we plan to study the effect of heterogeneous
ancillary types being dynamically priced by our deployed models,
and the best predicted subset of ancillaries being offered to the
customer. Given that various ancillaries compete for wallet-share
and shelf-space, it will help expand our understanding of whether
such pricing models compete, or collaborate, with each other.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a first step in the direction of efficient infer-
ence systems from booking data in the airline industry, compared to
past works that focus on strategic impacts. We successfully demon-
strate that ancillaries can be dynamically priced without using any
user specific information that violates customer privacy. We com-
pared three different dynamic pricing models (APP-LM, APP-DES
and DNN-CL) and their associated frameworks. Our results show
that the accuracy of estimating the demand and fine-tuning its
sensitivity to price, greatly influences the optimality of the recom-
mended price. Our offline experiments indicate that DNN-CL can
perform significantly better than APP-LM, APP-DES, and currently
deployed approaches, to maximize revenue. In online experiments,
our APP-LM model outperforms human-curated pricing systems
currently in use. By using reliable evaluation metrics that correlate
well with business impact, we hope to observe further improve-
ment in online metrics through our APP-DES and DNN-CL models
that are currently under deployment. Our work demonstrates the
promise of improved business value through highly accurately, con-
tinuously updated models for customer demand for ancillaries, and
their sensitivity to prices.
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